Former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s ‘Zeitenwende’ speech in February 2022 was supposed to mark a new beginning for Germany in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was followed by creation of a special debt fund for rearmament and a constitutional change to the debt brake led by Chancellor Friedrich Merz to allow debt funding for defence spending. Four years on, German rearmament remains dogged by the structural weaknesses that have plagued the German state for years.
This is seen in Germany’s first defence strategy, issued in April 2026. The plan is clear on the central threat faced by Europe – it mentions Russia 17 times. But beyond that, the analysis is disappointing, sidestepping the strategic realignment Germany urgently needs.
The main goal is for the Bundeswehr to be the “strongest conventional army in Europe” by 2039. This is far from realistic in a situation in which Ukraine and Russia both have 130 combat-ready and hardened brigades, compared to fewer than 10 in Germany. In exercises, the Ukrainians regularly defeat NATO units. It will take many decades for Germany’s armed forces to become the strongest in the conventional domain, if at all.
The strategy’s starting point should have been instead that European security can only be organised collectively. Unfortunately, when it comes to collective defence, the emphasis remains on NATO under US leadership. German rearmament is even described as a way for Germany to be “an even stronger military ally of the United States”.
It is, of course, clear that a European alternative is not easy to establish – including because of concerns about the outcome of the French presidential election in April 2027. Nevertheless, the alternative cannot be permanent dependence on the US. France, which is discussing expansion of its nuclear umbrella to European partners, does not feature in the German strategy. Nor do the United Kingdom or Poland.
European partners are moving faster. For example, the British lead the northern European Joint Expeditionary Force defence alliance. Ukraine, which has Europe’s strongest army, is a central partner in the force.
Europe is also absent from German defence procurement. Domestic companies get 60% of German orders – a doubling since 2020 – while almost nothing is ordered directly from European partners. Consequently, reliance on the US for certain weapons systems persists, even in areas where European alternatives are available.
The strategy has a second major weakness. It has a target horizon of 2035 to 2039 for the achievement of technological superiority in defence. This is too late: NATO has judged that Russia will be ready to attack Europe by 2029.
UK prime minister Keir Starmer has already called, in the UK 2025 Strategic Defence Review, for modernisation and the learning of lessons from Ukraine. In Warsaw, prime minister Donald Tusk has proclaimed a “drone armada” and made modernisation over 2025-2039 a top priority. The German Chancellor does not seem to be demanding this technological modernisation.
Consequently, the Bundeswehr continues to buy what it knows and not what it needs. Only a small and declining share of German defence procurement is allocated to ‘new paradigm’ weapons shown to be effective in Ukraine: autonomous systems, artificial-intelligence-supported reconnaissance and fire control, networked air and missile defence, electronic warfare and drone defence.
By comparison, the UK has more than doubled its spending on the new paradigm in absolute terms. Poland has increased its budget share allocated to the new paradigm eightfold since 2020-21.
The third main weakness of the German strategy is implementation. Delivery times for German defence contracts range from two to four years, similar to the UK and Poland. But unlike the UK and Poland, the proportion of German orders with no published final delivery date has risen steadily in the last five years and now stands at about 70%. Added to this is a lack of automated central tracking of deliveries. A state that places orders worth more than a hundred billion euros but cannot track what it has received has a problem that extends far beyond defence policy.
To correct the strategy’s shortcomings, Germany should place regional cooperation, including with Ukraine and core European nations, at the centre of its collective defence strategy. Procurement and training must be calibrated to the ‘new paradigm’, with clear targets for autonomous systems, drones and AI-supported platforms. The defence ministry must be committed to a radical modernisation – for example, so it can report in real time on what has been ordered and delivered. All this should be rooted in a ruthless new analysis. Chancellor Friedrich Merz should lead the urgently needed modernisation strategy.
A version of this First Glance was published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.