[SS: Analysis by Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, a research assistant at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]
Across the globe, a diverse group of nations that view world politics differently from the United States are rising and flexing their diplomatic muscle in ways that are complicating American statecraft. From Africa to Latin America, to the Middle East and Asia, these emerging powers refuse to fit into traditional U.S. thinking about the world order. The successful pursuit of American interests in the mid-21st century calls for a strategy that attracts them toward the United States and its ideals but without expecting them to line up in lockstep with Washington.
2 Comments
[SS: Analysis by Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, a research assistant at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]
Across the globe, a diverse group of nations that view world politics differently from the United States are rising and flexing their diplomatic muscle in ways that are complicating American statecraft. From Africa to Latin America, to the Middle East and Asia, these emerging powers refuse to fit into traditional U.S. thinking about the world order. The successful pursuit of American interests in the mid-21st century calls for a strategy that attracts them toward the United States and its ideals but without expecting them to line up in lockstep with Washington.
“We refuse to be a pawn in a new cold war,” Indonesian President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, [said](https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/___https:/www.ft.com/content/55428d56-fa9c-4c78-8f0e-59b34e094931___.YzJ1OmNhcm5lZ2llZW5kb3dtZW50Zm9yaW50ZXJuYXRpb25hbHBlYWNlOmM6bzpiZjM2MjMxZThlNjdhYWMzY2Q2MjNiYmQxZTlmMzEzNzo2OjU5YmY6ZGQ0ZThiODYwMmM2NjZmN2YwZWI0ZGJhOWI3ZGY1ZjM2YWFmNjliM2EzMTMyM2RlODJlZWVhNGJhYWM0NjcxMzpwOlQ) in November 2022. His views are shared in some form or another by leaders of Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. All 10 of these nations are either in the G-20 or have economies large enough to warrant membership. A majority of them have populations larger than Germany’s. Collectively, they [make up](https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/04/09/emerging-powers-and-future-of-american-statecraft-pub-92101) around a third of the world’s population and a fifth of its economic production, while also constituting a major share of the so-called global south’s population and economic production.
In the next two decades, emerging powers like these will climb the ranks of the world’s [largest economies](https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/___https:/www.pwc.com/gx/en/research-insights/economy/the-world-in-2050.html___.YzJ1OmNhcm5lZ2llZW5kb3dtZW50Zm9yaW50ZXJuYXRpb25hbHBlYWNlOmM6bzpiZjM2MjMxZThlNjdhYWMzY2Q2MjNiYmQxZTlmMzEzNzo2OjkzODQ6MjFhNjUyYjNlYTNmMzU0N2JiZDM1Y2RiOWY3OWU4NTBjY2UyYzQ1NDg3MDBjYzZhNWFkN2RjMmIyNGFmMWUzYzpwOlQ) and [populations](https://protect.checkpoint.com/v2/___https:/www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf___.YzJ1OmNhcm5lZ2llZW5kb3dtZW50Zm9yaW50ZXJuYXRpb25hbHBlYWNlOmM6bzpiZjM2MjMxZThlNjdhYWMzY2Q2MjNiYmQxZTlmMzEzNzo2OjgzMWQ6NTYyZjM1NmJlM2I3ODRlMWUzYTFhMGYwYjU0NDZmNTdkOTBiOGU5N2M0YjY5ZTgyNTliNTQ2MGM1MmI0NDA2ZTpwOlQ), reshaping the structure of world politics in the process. Their diplomacy is increasingly ambitious. And they are taking positions that run counter to those of the United States with growing boldness. Washington and its allies should accept not only that these powers are emerging, but also that as they grow stronger, they will not align with Washington’s preferences on many international issues, especially when it comes to Russia and China.
[Continue reading the full analysis here.](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/30/middle-powers-geopolitics-united-states-diplomacy/)
Mainland Asia is in a different situation from the southern continents and islands.