Tempi: Catapple The EPAAAM’s finding – “Everything was wrong, the data were destroyed in three days”

Τίποτα καινούριο αν και δεν ξέρω τι περίμενα να ακούσω.

Όλα σωστά γίνανε.

Ανάλογα από ποια μεριά το βλέπεις. 😉

> No soil and material samples or swabs from surfaces were taken from the scene of the accident before the remains
of the trains had already been carried away to the Koulouri field. At the request of families of the victims, the
judge ordered for samples to be taken from the soil at the scene of the accident and from the remains of the trains
at Koulouri, on 28th March 2023, 29 days after the accident. The results of the chemical analysis (undertaken by
the official State Chemistry Lab) were deemed inconclusive, due to the delay of 28 days and the contamination of
the scene

> Given their technical characteristics and the quantities of the materials in the trains that theoretically could have
contributed (e.g. liquid batteries in entangled powertrains and passenger wagons, electronic fluid in the traction
converter, cooling medium for air conditioners per passenger wagon, compressed air tanks in each locomotive),
these do not provide enough fuel to explain the creation and development of the observed fireball (80m and
sustained for 10 seconds). Furthermore, the technical description of the Restaurant Car (WRMZ coach) does not
list any installation of any type of liquified gas and the information provided is that no actual cooking takes place
on board; only electric sandwich toasters and microwave ovens are used to heat up pre-cooked food. Therefore,
ruling out any other flammable material from the Restaurant Car itself and by elimination of all other possibilities,
the most probable explanation for the above findings appears to be an unidentified volume of liquid fuel that is
caught inside the S-bend of the chassis of the Restaurant Car during the 2nd collision between the Restaurant Car
and the first platform of the 63503 freight train, and which is carried along to its final place among the other debris
of the carriages.

> One post-mortem report in particular
shows findings that prove that the person had survived the collision and lost his life due to the fire.
543 Laboratory testing for the detection of carboxyhaemoglobin could help to make this distinction. This particular
test, a standard test for any accident where fire is involved, would have provided crucial information about the
actual cause of death, even for very extensively burned bodies (2cc of blood would be enough for this test).
544 However, the test was only carried out for the 5 train drivers (4 active and 1 travelling as a passenger). For the 52
passengers that lost their lives in the accident, these tests were omitted in the initial post-mortem examinations.
Later examination was impossible, as all blood and tissue samples were destroyed on 10th April, only 40 days after
the accident.
545 From the autopsy reports, and to the surprise of interviewed specialists, it was found that the medical examiners
failed to obtain an alcohol blood test for the train driver of the IC-62. The reason for this, as officially declared in
witness statements, was that the remains did not contain enough blood for this test.

> The results of these tests rule out the possibility of PDMS silicone oils creating such a big fireball and pool fire, as the
only possible result is a small localized ignition that will not propagate through the rest of the material, even if the total
quantity of silicone oil is unrealistically atomized and dispersed all over the area. ….
fter testing 12 different
combinations of fuel quantities and fuel speeds for the two releases, the one most closely resembling the recorded
video was Case08_07 with respective quantities of 800 kg for stage 1, 1200 kg for Stage 2 and 300-500kg for stage 3
pool fire. Obviously, this is only to provide an order of magnitude and not an exact number, as there are other
combinations of fuel, velocities and geometries that could possibly replicate the target video. It is clear, though, that
the order of magnitude is correct, as it is not possible to create a comparable sized fireball without at least 2000kg of
fuel. Furthermore, absence of a large pool fire #1 as recorded by video evidence, rules out the possibility of a larger
quantity of fuel (e.g. 10-15tn) that would have created and sustained a large pool fire as an aftermath to the crash.

> Video footage showing the 63503 freight train, a very important piece of evidence, was initially missing from the
available materials for the investigation. The videos in question were recorded by approximately 50 different
cameras, recorded at separate digital recorders at the Thessaloniki Freight Station and at a further 18 different
stations or control points along the route. The 24 different hard disks that held the footage that possibly showed
the 63503 along the way, were not confiscated by the investigators, but rather asked for with a considerable delay
from the investigating judge. The additional delay of the replies from OSE (who is the owner and operator of the
surveillance camera system) meant that the footage in question was overwritten and could not be retrieved by
technical means. Another important fact that came up at a later date, was that the 6 hard disks that had been delivered to the
investigating judge’s office by OSE supposedly from the Thessaloniki Freight Station and supposedly showing the
loading of the freight train, were found to contain footage from the Thessaloniki Passenger Station which is
located at an entirely different area. All these delays, mistakes and claimed misunderstandings, result in the fact
that not one frame of video footage of the 63503 is available from the official surveillance video system operated
– via a contractor – by OSE.